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Abstract 
Advocates of natural resource accounting argue for the revision and reformulation of national 
accounting practices in order to better account for the depletion and degradation of a nation's 
resource  stocks  and  environmental  assets.  The  literature  is  predicated  on  three  key 
assumptions:  that  national  income  is  an  important  policy  variable  ("social  objective 
function"); that current accounting practices are poorly designed as social objective functions 
and  lead  to  bad  policy-making;  and  that  improving the  construction of  key  accounting 
aggregates will result in improvements in policy decisions and outcomes. The purpose of this 
paper is to examine the third of these claims. I introduce the "welfare-consistency"  criterion, 
which  is  satisfied when  changes in  a  "comprehensive  income"  measure  are  positively 
correlated with changes in welfare.  A series of simple counter-examples in a cake-eating 
economy is presented to show that this criterion is not generally satisfied by modifications 
proposed in the resource accounting literature.  The divergence between income and welfare 
is explicable in terms of consumer surplus, which plays a role in welfare but not in income. 
An example using renewable resources is also presented to show that sustainable equilibria 
may not be welfare-consistent. 
* I am indebted to a variety of people for comments and encouragement regarding the work 
summarised in this paper. Earlier versions were presented at Melbourne, California (Davis), and La 
Trobe universities, and the iMREB conference in Melbourne, Attendees provided stimulating 
feedback--especially  those individuals 1  found hardest to convince.  The Department of Agricultural 
Economics, University of California (Davis) also provided a hospitable and rigorous sabbatical 
environment in which to try out ideas. Elsewhere, Larry Goulder, and Jack Pezzey provided 
encouragement, gratefully received, Lastly, Dave Alden and Jim Thomson have provided advice and 
feedback over a period of time. None of the above is responsible for the contents. 1.  Introduction 
A major impetus behind the implementation of natural resource accounting is 
the idea that the existing measures of aggregate economic activity are biased: 
and  furthermore, that  this  bias  is  argued  to  affect  the  way  we  behave.  A 
powerful  metaphor is provided by Repetto  (1988), who  claims that with  our 
current national accounting practices we are "steering by the wrong compass". 
In particular, Repetto notes that  conventional national  accounting leads us to 
treat what should be viewed as reductions in wealth (depletion of mineral stocks, 
deforestation,  soil  erosion)  as  events  leading  to  increased  income.  The 
consequence of this  is to  provide distorted incentives with  regard  to natural 
resource use and management. 
It is important to be clear regarding this line of argument, particularly as it is 
used  to  endorse  making  alterations to  our  usual  accounting practices.  The 
argument has three stages; or alternatively, it rests on three key assumptions.1 
First, measured national income (in particular GDP or GNP) is regarded as an 
important variable for affecting economic policy (and implicit in that, resource 
use). Second, conceptual flaws in the design/construction of these aggregates is 
said to lead to biased signals regarding policy, and the practical consequence of 
this is overuse of (or excessive damage to) resource stocks and environmental 
assets.  Third,  by  appropriately  accounting  for  the  resource  use  and 
environmental damage,  it  is  argued  (or  perhaps  assumed)  that  the  "biased 
compass" will be re-aligned to give correct signals--correct  in the sense that 
costs  of resource  depletion  or  environmental  damage  will  be  measured  in 
national income as an offsetting item. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the third of these assumptions or claims. 
In  doing so, we  shall take the first two  as given and focus primarily on the 
question  of  how  modifying  the  national  accounts  in  line  with  the 
recommendations arising fiom the resource accounting literature will "improve" 
Almost the entire literature on natural resource accounting proceeds taking the following 
assumptions as given, while a critical literature exists that enquires as to the validity of one or 
other of them. the policy decisions and outcomes of the nation undertaking the modifications. 
Note that all three of the assumptions outlined above are a priori claims, not 
well-established  and  empirically verified  propositions.  It  is not  at  all  clear 
whether the use of the conventional aggregates has in itselfbeen responsible for 
poor  environmental policy in any given country over any given time frame, 
althougb it  is quite possibly the case in some. We will  take the appropriate 
question here to be: lfthe current system of national accounts is sending poor 
signals regarding resource management, should modifying the accounts lead to 
clear improvements in such signals and the decisions resulting from them? 
In  fact,  the  dominant  stream  of  conceptual  work  in  the  national  resource 
accounting literature actually proceeds in a different direction, with a different 
set  of  questions in  mind. Rather  than  ask  what  signals are,  or should  be, 
provided  to  policymakers  by  a  modified index  number  ("greened  national 
income"), the formal literature asks what interpretation can be applied to income 
in the context of an  optimal growth model. Thus, instead of asking how to 
construct a measure of income that provides policy-relevant information, the 
growth-theoretic  approach,  outlined  below,  provides  a  welfare-economics 
rationale for combining consumption and capital accumulation in a single index 
in  an  optimizing context;  and  modifications to  standard growth models for 
resource and environmental factors are used to motivate accounting adjustments 
that will maintain the welfare interpretation. 
Much of the more applied work in the field of "natural resource accounting" 
(NRA) or "environmental  accounting"  at the national level refers back to the 
theoretical  underpinnings  first  provided  by  Weitzman  (1976),  connecting 
national income with economic welfare (defined in terms of discounted fbture 
consumption2), Weitzrnan showed that static national income was, under certain 
conditions, a measure of economic welfare in the sense of being equivalent to 
I use "economic welfare" as a shorthand to denote the assumption used in this paper that the 
welfare we will be analytically concerned with here is based on consumption; in the main part of 
the paper, this will mean consumption of an exhaustible resource. The important point is that, 
for our purposes, all the endogenous (i.e.  policy-relevant) variables that contribute to welfare are 
represented in  the utility function. the  discounted  value  of  the  future  consumption stream  that  a  competitive 
economy would generate (or a benevolent utilitarian planner would choose),3 
What  is  striking  about  the  literature  that  has  developed  in  the  wake  of 
Weitman's work4 is that it is concerned with the interpretation of income in a 
measurement sense, but not (with a few exceptions) in a policy sense.  That is, 
the  question  at the heart  of  much  of  the work  in  this  area is,  under  what 
circumstances is there a  connection between measured national income, and 
economic welfare?  The answer is that the circumstances are quite restrictive, 
and  require  that  the  economy is competitively optimising (or,  equivalently, 
solving an intertemporal planning problem).  In the studies in ths tradition in 
which  economists  have  turned  their  attention  to  non-optimising  situations 
(Aronsson, Johansson and Lofgren, 1996, Ch. 4; Aronsson and Lofgren, 19981, 
the question has again been one of measurement, i.e. what alterations have to be 
made to conventional linear measures of income to make them usefil welfare 
measures? In second best situations, changes at the margin, such as externality 
effects, need to be taken into account for the Weitman-like equivalence to hold. 
(The operational difficulty is that this requires knowledge of effects not captured 
in market prices.) 
The pressing policy issue-does  "greening"  our measure of  GDP provide us 
with useful signals to  improve our use of natural resources-is  comparatively 
underinvestigated.  Maler  (1 991)  and  more recently  Johansson  and  Lofgren 
(1 996) investigate whether marginal perhubations to income in Weitman-type 
models provide cost-benefit signals regarding possible projects or policy actions. 
Again, this analysis requires the economy to be optimising, with the cost-benefit 
signal providing an assessment of  a small project or policy change. This is not 
A "plain English" interpretation of Weitwnan's result is that a hypothetical consumption level, 
equal to consuming all of today f  national income in every period forever, would generate the 
same total discounted utility, or wealth, as the actual (non-constant) consumption that the 
economy would generate by following the competitive trajectory. In present value terms,  we 
consume the equivalent of a Hicksian income stream equal to today's national income, hence it is 
sometimes referred to as the annuity-equivalent result, 
Early examples applying Weitzman's analysis to natural resource accounting issues include 
Hartwick (1990) and Maler (1991). This growing literature has since been well summarized in 
Aronsson, Johansson and Lofgren (1996). the same as presenting policymakers with a guide to prudent consumption, or an 
indication of whether resource stocks are being depleted too fast. 
Is it more generally possible to treat appropriately "greened" income as a form 
of decision rule,  either in  the local sense (Can income be treated  as a cost- 
benefit  function,  such that  marginal  actions  which  increase  income can  be 
regarded as being welfare-increasing, whether or not we start "near"  an optimal 
trajectov?) or the global sense (Can income be treated as an objective function, 
such that rnaxirnising income is identical with maximising welfare?). If we are 
trying to correct a misaligned compass, these seem the sorts of criteria we would 
like our modified income measure to fulfil. 
In the next section, we discuss the ways in which we might regard income as a 
decision-rule, and outline a set of desirable properties that we may wish income 
to possess if it  is to function as a policy-relevant measure. We introduce the 
concept of welfare-consistency to assist in the analysis. In the following section, 
we provide a counter-example showing that "greened  GDP"  fails to Eunction 
according  to  the  desirable  properties  we  would  specify  for  a  policy-useful 
decision-rule Based on economic welfare. 
2.  Correcting the Compass: What Would We Like National Income To 
Tell Us? 
National  income,  as  currently  measured,  is most  defensible  simply  as  an 
indicator  of  current  market  sector  activity.  Conventional  Gross  Domestic 
Product explicitly excludes productive activity outside the market sector, just as 
it excludes activity that degrades environmental capital, broadly defined.  This is 
exactly the bias that, it  is  argued, needs to be rectified by--in  particular- 
environmental adjustment of national income. 
The metaphor introduced previously is that, based on current practice, we are 
"steering by the wrong compass".  However, there does not exist a literature that 
constructs an "ideal  compass" Erom  first principles.  Rather, the focus has been 
on which individual elements should be incorporated into a measure, with the presumption being that  a measure that  contains all the  appropriate elements, 
appropriately weighted,  will  function in  some useful  fashion.  The relevant 
question for our purposes is, therefore, what property (or properties) should an 
ideal compass possess? 
First, as a broad macro aggregate, we need to decide what objective is being 
considered. Two that typically feature in the resource accounting literature are 
werare (or "economic well being")  and sustainability. We shall not dwell here 
on the distinction between the two, but note that it is easy to envisage situations 
in which actual welfare is increasing over time while sustainability prospects are 
being eroded.5 
In  this paper, we  focus primarily on welfare, using a straightforward present- 
value measure of economic welfare. We then return to the previous question: 
what properties should a welfare-relevant index possess? What roles might such 
an index play in the public policy sphere? Two possibilities suggest themselves: 
decision rule, and peflormrsnce indicator. We examine these in turn. 
2.1  Income's Role as  a Decision Rule or Objective Function 
The first is as a policy-relevant decision-rule.  (That is, for example, using the 
index as a guide for policy decisions.)  In particular it could be used as a form of 
cost-benefit rule (undertake actions which increase the index); or alternatively, it 
could be used  as  an  objective function (treat the  index  as something to be 
maximised).  Both  of  these have been  posited  in the  literature. Prior  to  the 
development of  the formal  approach  outlined above,  Denison (1972, p.469) 
wrote: 
"It  would be enormously convenient to have a single, generally accepted 
index of the economic and social welfare of the (population). A glance at 
it would tell us how much better or worse off we had become each year 
and each decade. We could judge the desirability of any proposed action 
by whether it would raise or lower this index." 
In the natural resource accounting literature, it is not always clear which of these objectives is 
being considered: sometimes they are deliberately codated (see e.g. Stockhammer et. a1  1997), 
or else only vague mention is made to one or other or both without clear specification as to 
which is meant or why. This clearly outlines the policy usefblness of an aggregate decision-rule such as 
a modified national income measure.  As mentioned, Johannson and Lofgren 
(1996) have  since used  formal analysis to examine the circumstances under 
which a properly constructed income aggregate will function as a local cost- 
benefit measure, coming to rather more cautious conclusions than  did  Maler 
(1  99  1). 
However,  Hamilton  (1994,  pp. 158-9) remarks  that  according to  the  formal 
approach developed by Weitzrnan, 
"NNP is what a planner would choose to maximize, subject to certain 
efficiency conditions, at  each point in time in order to maximize the 
present value of consumption." 
It seems that the role of income as a useful social objective hction  is assured. 
However, there does remain the question of how  income can  operate as  an 
objective function as per Hamilton (1994), which is a very general role, but yet 
be restricted in its usefulness in the more limited role of a decision-rule in cost- 
benefit terms as  per  Johansson and  Lofgren  (1996). The answer lies in the 
"certain efficiency conditions" Hamilton mentions in passing. If we don? how 
whether they are satisfied, what  can we say about using income as a policy 
measure as  Hamilton suggests? That is the subject of this paper. 
2.2  lncome 's Role as a Performance indicator 
The  second possible policy-relevant finction  for  an  index such as "greened 
GDP" to perform is as a kind ofperformance indicator.  For example, we could 
measure growth over a period of time and draw a conclusion about whether such 
growth was "sustainable"  or not; or at least that such measured growth was a 
truer measure of the change in living standards in the economy than is provided 
by  our  current measures.  The fact  that  economists from James Tobin  and 
William Nordhaus  (Nordhaus  and  Tobin,  1972) to  Robert  Repetto  and  his 
coauthors (Repetto, Magrath, Wells, Beer, and Rossini, 1989) have undertaken 
adjustments  to  conventionally  measured  income  in  a  number  of  different 
countries,  suggests that  they  take  seriously the notion  that  a  time  series of adjusted national income provides a truer picture of real economic growth than a 
time series of the conventionally measured figures. While this is less the focus 
of the current paper, its conclusions have some bearing on the validity of using 
national income as (for example) a time series indicator of well-being. 
2.3  The Criterion of  Interest 
As suggested several paragraphs above, two issues have been focussed on in the 
literature to date: weEfare (or economic efficiency) and sustainability.  Further, 
we have two roles that  an  index might  serve: first as a decision rule (Is an 
increase in the  index consistent with  improving welfare/sustainability?); and 
second, as a performance indicator (Does the path of the index over time yield 
information  in  how  our  economy  is  pedorming  with  respect  to 
welfare/sustainability?). 
An ideal index could perform both roles. However, an index that serves as a 
useful decision rule--undertake  actions that increase the index-may  only pass 
a weaker test than a performance indicator would need to. In the decision rule 
case, all that is needed is an index that is ordinally consistent with changes in 
welfare or sustainability: the index need only be monotonically related to the 
underlying criterion of interest. For a performance measure to be effective, it has 
to have some cardinal relationship with this criterion. In other words if the index 
rises by some given amount (e.g. in dollar terms), this dollar increase must have 
some  interpretation in terms of  welfare or  sustainability. Things must  have 
improved or worsened by  a certain amount, for any given change in the index. 
To make the analysis here as general as possible, we focus on welfare, using a 
straightforward present-value  formulation. We  then  specify  a  decision  rule 
criterion ("'welfare-consistency") that, being weaker than a performance measure 
criterion, means we have set a lower hurdle for adjusted income to clear, as a 
policy-useful indicator. In  the next section, we outline how  to  construct the 
index we are interested in, and in the following sections we specify the welfare- 
consistency property, and test the variations of our index against it. 3.  Income and Depreciation for An Optimislng, Cake-Eating Economy 
In  this section a model of a simple "cake-eating''  economy is outlined, for the 
purpose of looking at how we would account for income in such an economy. 
Dasgupta  (1990,  p.61)  observes  that,  in  an  economy  living  solely  off  an 
exhaustible  resource,  employing  a  measure  of  income  which  includes 
depreciation of resource stocks "valued of course at accounting prices ... leads to 
the seemingly paradoxical result that NDP in a country which lives solely off its 
exhaustible resources  is  nil,  and  it  is  nil  no  matter  how  high  the  current 
consumption is."  Why this is so will be explained below when we revise the 
Hotelling principle (sometimes referred to as the the r%  rule), and apply it to a 
simple example of a resource-dependent economy. 
However, Dasgupta's statement requires some caveats.  His statement is correct 
if the economy lives solely off its exhaustible resources, but more generally an 
economy whose sole asset endowment is a non-renewable natural resource may 
be able to turn their fixed asset into a continuing consumption stream (Hicksian 
income).  One such circumstmce is when  reinvestment  of the proceeds into 
produced capital is possible (see El Serafl, 1989; and the discussion of El Serafl 
in Hartwick and Hageman,  1993).  The other is when trade in the resource is 
allowed  (see Usher,  1994; Asheim,  1996; Sefton and Weale,  1996; Brekke 
1997). 
The other major caveat is that Dasgupta's statement is correct as long as the rate 
of depletion is Hotelling-efficient (to be defined shortly), or when the current 
market price is presumed (for national accounting purposes) to be equal to the 
shadow price: that is, if the depletion path is assumed to be efficient. 
We will avoid the  issue of measuring depreciation when  a Hicksian income 
stream  is  possible,  by  focussing  on  a  cake-eating  closed  economy  (no 
reinvestment  and  no  trade).  In  the  following section, we will  examine the 
consequences of the last caveat, that of optimality, while in this section we will 
assume  optimal  depletion,  in  a  sense  to  be  defined,  and  demonstrate  why 
Dasgupta's claim is correct in such circumstances. We  follow  Weitman's  advice  to  "abstract  heroically"  for  our  cake-eating 
society, using the following assumptions: 
the demand cwe  for the resource is given, time-invariant and known to all; 
0  the resource stock is given and known-no  new stocks are found, at least not 
in any time-frame which should concern us; 
there are no extraction costs; 
the proceeds of extraction are consumed-there  is no reinvestment (physical 
or financial); 
there is no international trade; 
there are no  stock effects (only currently  extracted units of the resource 
contribute to current utility); 
there  is  no  disutility associated  with  extraction  or  consumption  of  the 
resource (i.e. no pollution); and 
the analysis is conducted in discrete time. 
Thus, the model is designed to be the simplest of all possible worlds. There are 
no income effects fiom resource depletion (no saving or reinvestment), there is 
no uncertainty and no key parameters change. 
The notation for the examples in the rest of the paper will observe the following 
pattern. 
Q, = the total (remaining) stock of the resource at the beginning of period t. 
g, = the amount extracted in period t. 
p, -  the unit market price in period t, given extraction g,. 
pI  = the underlying present value (i.e.  evaluated at a reference period, e.g. at 
period zero) shadow price of the resource in period t, given extant stock Q, . 
This bold notation is important to understand, as it is used  extensively in the 
examples that follow. If we evaluate income at period t, say, a bold  p,  denotes the  shadow  price  in  that  period,  However,  if  a  bold  p,,]  appears  in  the 
expression, it denotes the shadow value of a unit of the resource in period t+l 
(given current extraction) but  in period  t dollars, This simply enables us to 
avoid the usual discount factor notation. 
These assumptions enable us to  portray the impact of resource extraction on 
unadjusted national income as follows. 
A standard national accounting formula for "period zero" would be of the form: 
GDP,  = consumption -I- (gross)  investment 
where  gross  investment  refers  to  new  capital  formation,  without  regard  to 
depreciation  of  existing capital. Since there  is no  capital formation in this 
example, then we ignore the second term in gross income, and concentrate only 
on consumption (equivalent to "production" for our purposes).  Some amount of 
the resource will  be  extracted in period  zero,  and  sold  at  the market  price 
associated  with  that  quantity.  (Alternatively, we  can  think  of  the  quantity 
extracted as being evaluated in marginal utility terms.)  This will be measured as 
that period's Gross Domestic Product, as follows: 
There is no capital formation, but there is capital consumption, if we regard the 
resource stock (the "cake")  as a capital item. Standard principles of resource 
accounting  suggest  that  an  appropriately  adjusted  income  measure  should 
account for this capital consumption. Thus, we need a method for adjusting the 
income measure GDP to do this.  In reality, we will be limited by a great degree 
of ignorance regarding true changes in  stock  levels, the appropriate shadow 
prices and so on.  (Many of the discussions of applied NRA  are written in the 
context  of  overcoming such  data problems.)  The purpose  of  our  example, however, is to allow ourselves to assume away any data difficulties and focus on 
national income as if we could compute it accurately with ease. 
The most common approach for incorporating non-renewable resource depletion 
into the national accounts is the depreciation approach, as discussed by Repetto 
(1988), Repetto et  al. (1989), Dasgupta (1990) and  Hartwick  (1990) among 
others. The logic of this approach is equivalent to the treatment of produced 
capital in the computation of Net Domestic Product (NDP)--as  well as adding 
the value of newly produced capital as part of gross income, one would wish to 
subtract appropriately measured depreciation of the existing capital stock. 
Being  mindfbl  of  Dasgupta's  comment  about  valuing  changes  in  stocks  at 
accounting prices, and Maler's (1 991) dictum that 
"The  value of the change in the stock (not the change in 
the value of the stock) should be included.  Anticipated 
capital gains are not parts of national income." '7,  Maler 
1991.) 
it should be clear that what I shall label the orthodox approach is to define per- 
period depreciation of  a natural resource as the change in the resource stock 
times the current shadow price, i.e. 
(2)  NDP, = GDP, -  depreciation =  pogo -  .go 
To  understand  how  we  should  think  about  depreciation  (and  thus,  shadow 
values) in this context, it is usefiil to go back over what we know about the 
theory  of  natural  resource  depletion,  in  particular the  "optimal  depletionyy 
arguments developed by Hotelling (1  93 1).  Hotelling's solution had the elegant 
duality  of  standard  general  equilibrium  results:  that  the  conditions  for 
competitive  equilibrium  also  characterised  the  solution  to  an  optimising 
(welfare-maximising) problem, as if solved by a benevolent planner.  In the 
context that follows, we are interested in Hotelling's Rule as a normative result, 
not  as  a  competitive  equilibrium  condition.  In  other  words,  we  are  not attempting  to  predict  an  actual  price/depletion  path;  rather,  we  are  using 
Hotelling's Rule to derive a shadow value in response to any extraction decision 
made today. 
(It should be stated up-.front that the optimising problem takes the specific form 
of a present-value-of-utility maximizing problem, which thus has no  explicit 
intergenerational focus.) 
The  key  feature  of  Hotelling's  solution  was  that  welfare  maximization  is 
compatible with the resource price (net of extraction costs where these were 
positive) rising ova time at a rate equal to  the interest rate, and exhaustion 
would occur just as the resource price hit the "choke price".  The choke price is 
defined as either the price where demand for the resource falls to zero, or else 
where an alternative  technology becomes economically viable.6 
Thus the optimal depletion path defined by Hotelling has the property that the 
present value of a unit of the resource stays constant over time.  In other words, 
along  this  path,  p,  =  p,, =  p,, 'v't  E  (0, T)  ,  where  T  is  the  period  in  which 
exhaustion occurs, and so the depreciation term exactly cancels out the value of 
the current sales, leaving Net Domestic Product equal to zero.' 
(For the purposes of the rest of this paper, the unit shadow value of the resource, 
p, ,  will be derived from the Hotelling optimization problem.) 
In the following section, we relax the assumption that the economy follows a 
Hotelling-efficient  depletion  path,  and  investigate the  consequences  for  the 
We have not evoked the existence of a backstop technology so far, and so will confine 
ourselves to the case where demand falls to zero, Readers may object to a focus on a finite- 
horizon example where life "stops"  after the resource is used up,  One way of dealing with this 
(apart &om imposing an assumption of asymptotic depletion) would be to imagine that the 
country in question also produced a renewable staple, with exogenously fixed growth and harvest 
rates (equal to the discount rate).  This good is used for subsistence, while the exhaustible 
resource under examination generates additional utility.  Then, NDP as discussed above becomes 
the addition to income over and above that due to the renewable resource, and subsistence 
survival carries on after exhaustion, signals thus provided by a "greened  income"  index for resource-management 
purposes. 
4,  National Income and Welfare-Consistency 
If it is true that the standard measure of national income is inadequate for policy 
purposes,  and  that  we are therefore "steering  by the wrong  compass",  what 
defines  an  improvement  in  the  compass's  accuracy?  Here  we  offer  a 
formalisation of the "compass"  metaphor, and test it against both gross and net 
income.  Having decided to focus our attention on economic welfare, we can 
take  efficiency in  depletion  to  be  our  aim  in  the  cake-eating  context.  An 
appropriate compass will  guide us to  efficiency by providing increasing the 
"reward"-raising  national income-as  present value welfare increases.  This is 
smarised  in the following definition. 
Definition:  An  index is said to be welfare-consistent ifan increase/decrease in 
the index implies an incuease/decrease in weuare (appropriately defined). 
The idea of welfare-consistency as defined  above seems to  be a reasonable 
property for a well  aimed economic "compass"  to possess,  and seems in the 
spirit of Denison's  previously presented suggestion.  It  suffices as a decision- 
rule test-for  a welfare-consistent index, do things that increase the index-and 
it will also have the property of an objective function-maximising  a welfare 
consistent index will be consistent with maximizing welfare. 
In  this  case,  with  income  under  optimal  depletion  equal  to  zero,  welfare 
consistency implies at least that national income be negative when extraction is 
sub-optimal. The modified national income measure, in other words, must reach 
a maximum at zero (at the optimal quantity as  defined by Hotelling) and be 
negative elsewhere. This enables us to test welfare-consistency here in quite a 
straightforward manner, 
Landefeld and Hines (1985) discuss several ways in which depreciation can be valued in 
practice.  These will be evaluated briefly at the end of Section 3. The current practice in national accounting, which ignores many economically 
valuable forms of production  and  consumption, is virtually by  definition in 
violation of welfare-consistency. However, in the context of this paper, there is 
only one consumption good, the resource, and we can measure it without error. 
In such a context does GDP violate the welfare-consistency criterion? 
Proposition  1:  Gross domestic product,  as  defined in  equation  (I),  is  not 
welfare-consistent. 
"Proof ': (Most of the proofs in the text will be heuristic; some more detail will 
be provided in the Appendix.)  Given the static market conditions assumed in 
our example (where only the total  stock changes through time as a result of 
extraction), the  condition for maximizing GDP  is the same in every period, 
implying constant extraction in each period.  Efficiency requires, on the other 
hand, declining extraction per period and consequently a rising price path.  Thus 
maximizing GDP can not be compatible with efficient extraction. 
Turning now to net measures, we have established a benchmark level of zero 
NDP  as being  consistent  with  efficiency in  our  cake-eating  example:  the 
question then becomes, is zero the maximum NDP achievable?  That is, is it the 
case that  inefficient extraction gives us negative NDP?  If  not,  then welfare- 
consistency is immediately violated. 
Proposition 2:  Net domestic product  as defined in equation (2) is not welfare- 
consistent. 
Proof:  In equation (2), for national income to be welfare-consistent requires at 
least that NDP be non-positive when resource use is inefficient since it is zero 
when  resource use  is efficient.  In  the  context of our  example, we rewrite 
equation (2) as follows: It  can easily be  seen that  for  any  p,  > po, NDP  will  be non-negative,  only 
reaching zero when p,  hits the choke price (i.e, when q, = 0).  If it can ever be 
the  case that  the actual price in any period is greater than the shadow price 
associated with the resource in that period, then NRA-adjustment does not lead 
to welfare-consistency of national income. 
To demonstrate that NDP  is not welfare-consistent (that is, it is possible that 
p, > po)  is trivially easy. For beginning-of-period shadow prices-that  is, those 
defined on the stock at the start of the accounting period-they  are depined as 
constant through that period.  So any quantity extracted below the qo consistent 
with given shadow price po would drive the market price above the shadow 
price and  raise NDP  above zero.  For  any  downward sloping demand  curve 
defined over all q, this is possible for any shadow price below the choke price. 
By contrast, end-of-period shadow prices are influenced by current extraction. 
Any extraction levels compatible with positive NDP as described above will be 
conservative with respect to the efficient level of  extraction.  The remaining 
stock will  be larger than  it would  have been had  the efficient amount been 
extracted, thus driving the current shadow price down, resulting in NDP being 
not only positive but greater than it would be if we were using beginning-period 
shadow prices.  QED. 
Remark:  Maximizing  N.  results  in  a  conservative  depletion path  being 
followed relative to the eflcient path. 
The intuition for this result should be obvious fiom the discussion above; and all 
of the points established above can be illustrated easily on a simple diagram. 
(See Figure 1.) The two parts of the diagram show the effects of extraction in 
"period  zero".  The bottom half shows the demand curve for the resource. The 
pair  (p, ,  q, ) represents the efficient price-quantity choice. The area p, Eq, 0 is 
gross  income  for  this  combination,  with  depreciation  being  an  equivalent 
amount  and  net  income  (NDP)  being  zero.  (Maximising  GDP  involves choosing a combination of p  and q to maximize an area BCFO.  Note that as 
drawn,  maximizing  GDP  involves  extracting  less  than  would  be  initially 
extracted if following an  optimal path. This is in fact an arbitrary choice; the 
relationship  between  welfare-maximising  extraction  and  CSDP-maximising 
extraction depends upon the demand elasticity.) 
For a given shadow price, a higher market price results in positive NDP. If the 
price is pushed up to  p,'  by lowering the amount extracted today to  qi,  gross 
income becomes the area p,' A qi 0,  depreciation is po D qi  0, and NDP is equal 
to the difference, a positive amount given by  p,'~~  p, .  It  is easy to see that 
inflating national income involves reducing extraction in any period below the 
efficient amount that would bring the shadow and market prices into line. If we 
take the objective function that generated the shadow prices as the appropriate 
one, and if there are no externalities unaccounted for in the arithmetic we have 
done  (which  might  warrant  slower  depletion  than  economic  efficiency  as 
defined  here  would  dictate), then  this  tells  us  that  simple natural  resource 
accounting is in conflict with economic efficiency. 
5.  Some Brief Extensions 
5.1  Including Valuation E_fScects 
Despite the  previous  discussion on  the  appropriate measure  of  depreciation 
being net  of any revaluation effects, some authors have explicitly referred to 
depreciation as measuring the dotal change in value of a capital asset (see Eisner 
1990;  Hartwick  and  Hageman  1993).  It  is  important  to  understand  the 
distinction: the  '"value of  the  change"  measure analysed previously excludes 
anything that could be interpreted as capital gain. The "total change in value" is 
implicitly  capital-gain inclusive  and  thus  at  odds  with  national  accounting 
practice. We do not  enter  here  into  any discussion of the issues that  arise from the 
possible inclusion of capital gains into measures of national incomes, except to 
examine how a "full change in value" measure performs in terms of the welfare- 
consistency criterion. That is, we  investigate whether accounting for the full 
change in value of a resource restores welfare consistency to a measure of net 
income.  (Note that  in this context, the only capital gains or losses we will 
witness are endogeous, due to changes in the amount extracted in any period.)g 
In these circumstances, we measure depreciation as the full change in  vaizds of 
the stock, rather than just the physical change evaluated at a fixed shadow price. 
This implies an income formula as follows: 
where the term in square brackets is the full change in value. Noting that 
Q, =  Q, -  qo  ,  we can rewrite the above expression as: 
This is a more complex expression than the others we have encountered thus far. 
Changes in extraction in a period will now have more mutually offsetting effects 
on income than before, as the next period's  shadow price is now part of the 
expression,  Will  these  effects  be  sufficient  to  provide  us  with  a  welfare 
consistent measure?  Some discussion as to why the answer is No is provided in 
On this, see the debate between Scott, Eisner and Bradford in the Journal ofEconomic 
Literature (1990). 
The interpretation of capital gains in such measures, in both closed and open economy 
contexts, is left for examination elsewhere. Our interest here is purely in the effect on welfare 
consistency of income. the Appendix.10 (Discussion of a particular "Hicksian" version of depreciation, 
and whether it satisfies welfare-consistency, is also given in the Appendix.) 
5.2  Present Value, Net Price and User Cost 
The applied literature on NRA has put forward practical proposals for adjusting 
national accounting measures for resource depletion, and these can be discussed 
at  this point  in the light of  the  above results.  Landefeld and Hines (1985) 
discuss two key methods of adjustment.  One is the Present Value method, in 
which,  as  the  name  suggests,  an  explicit  attempt  is made  to  estimate the 
discounted net value of future sales of the resource.  An easier method is the Net 
Price method which just applies the current net price to units left in the ground; 
this implicitIy assumes that a competitive equilibrium is prevailing.  Obviously, 
if such an equilibrium does prevail, both methods yield the same result, and in 
that sense they are variations on the "depreciation"  theme, as per Proposition 2, 
Section 4.  However, that neither of these pass the test of welfare-consistency is 
shown in the Appendix.  (The intuition is easy to grasp though; for the Present 
Value method, it is apparent that choosing an extraction pattern to maximise the 
present value of the resource stock is not the same as maximising the present 
value  of  the  social  benefit  from  consuming the  resource.  One  implies  a 
monopolistic extraction path, the other a competitive one.  For the Net  Price 
method, the assumption of optimal depletion means that income will be zero by 
construction,  regardless  of  the  relationship between  optimal  extraction  and 
actual extraction.) 
For completeness, we should note that the norninalJrea1 dichotomy becomes complex in the 
WeitzmaniHartwick et al. world.  While the Hamiltonian analyses of these authors have been 
conducted in terms of current-price NDP, it is real NDP in the  sense that it is a reflection of real 
(present value) consumption possibilities, at least if the Hotelling path is being followed.  The 
resource price rises over time, but that is directly due to the continuing depletion of the resource; 
it is not inflationary in the typical sense, but rather reflects real changes in the shadow price. The 
Weitzman~Hartwick  result thus concerns real NDP, but it is computed using each period's prices 
(where, along the Hotelling path, market and shadow prices are identical).  Brekke (1994) and 
Usher (1994) have pointed out that the standard accounting approach to calculating real NDP 
involves using constant prices acrossperiods, which will produce different figures to those 
produced by using the Harniltonian approach. It is eay to demonstrate that nothing is gained in 
terms of welfare-consistency  by adopting a constant-price rule across periods, Another approach to accounting for natural resource depletion is the User-Cost 
adjustment advocated by Salah El Serafy (see El Serafy 1989) as an alternative 
to the depreciation approach, which he argues is inherently flawed.  In a world 
where reinvestment of resource rents is possible, then it does seem that netting 
out all the Hotelling rents (to leave income of zero in the examples above) does 
fail  to  distinguish  between  that  component  of  current  extraction  which 
represents  capital  consumption,  and  that  which  is  required  to  generate  a 
perpetual income stream.  (See the discussion in Hartwick and Hageman, 1993.) 
In the simplest example, it is obvious that a mine (a wasting asset) can be sold 
and  the  proceeds  converted  into  infinitely-lived  bonds,  thus  providing 
(potentially) a  constant  consumption  stream  forever.  El  Serafy  provides  a 
formula for identifying the fi-action of resource revenues that represent a "return 
on capital" rather than consumption of capital.11  In the examples above, the 
focus has been  on  a cake-eating economy in order to justify  the use  of the 
depreciation method rather than El Serafy's User Cost approach.  However, in 
the Appendix I summarise my arguments from that earlier paper as to why El 
Serafy's adjustment also fails to satisfy welfare-consistency. 
6.  Further Decision Rules 
In  the previous section, we  explored  a  variant  of  a decision-rule based  on 
'"eened"  national income, namely, taking those actions which raise income.  In 
particular, we investigated the rule "maximise national income",  and found that 
it  was  inconsistent  with  maximising  welfate (as  defined by  a  conventional 
intertaporal welfare function).  Here we briefly explore some alternatives to 
the 'knaximise national income" decision-rule. 
One such alternative is to maximise economic (NDP)  growth.  (How are we to 
interpret  year-by-year  changes in  national  income,  having  adjusted  national 
income in the ways theory suggests, and how might these changes be used as a 
decision criterion?)  We know that, if we are using our non-renewable resource 
efficiently, growth ought to be zero since efficient depletion leads to national 
'I We note in passing that El Sera@ is not in favour of making analogies between produced and income being zero every period.  However, it  should be clear that since it is 
possible to produce a positive NDP  in  each period,  it is possible to produce 
positive rates ofgrowth in NDP if they are desired.  But since a positive figure 
for either net income, or growth in net income, is economically inefficient- 
even if one or other seems to be a politically sensible thing to aim for, not least 
because  it  looks  economically  responsible-neither  maximum  NDP  nor 
maximum growth in NDP over some horizon can be taken as usefil efficiency 
indicators.  12 
What about moving beyond the aggregate index number labeled NDP, and using 
its components as a guide to resource use?  In more complex models, we could 
disaggregate at  a number of levels, but  in a simple cake-eating economy the 
most obvious and relevant disaggregation is between the two components, gross 
income  and  depreciation.  Depreciation  as a  proportion of  national  income 
hardly seems like a sensible basis for a decision rule, in the sense that there is no 
obvious justification for treating it as something to be maximized or minimized 
(given that it could be negative).  Once again, from the Hotelling condition, it is 
clear that depreciation in such an economy, correctly measured, should be just 
equal to gross income from extraction. (While this is appropriate given our best 
estimates of the shadow price of the resource, keep in mind that this holds by 
construction if  we  use  the Net  Price method  of  evaluating depreciation  as 
described in Section 4 above.) 
It might be fairly concluded that the most useful information content deriving 
fkom  NRA-adjustment  of  national  income  comes  from  the  disaggregated 
components of national income, rather than the index number itself.  While the 
index number does in fact admit of an economic interpretation, to be discussed 
natural capital in the way a number of other economists are. 
l2 This is not necessarily confrned to non-optimizing economies. Brekke (1994) discusses an 
example of optimal policy choice in  which maximizing NRA-adjusted income growth conflicts 
with maximizing welfare. in  the  next  section,  there  is  a  case  for  claiming  that  the  parts  are  more 
illabating  than the whole.13 
7.  Interpretation and Discussion 
As has been already intimated, the results so far give rise to  questions and 
concerns regarding the public policy aspects of natural resource use, and what 
role  environmental  adjustment  of national  income might play  in  the  policy 
process.  Specifically, some seemingly reasonable resource-use rules of thumb 
based  on  appropriately  adjusted  national  income  fail  basic  conditions  of 
ewnomic efficiency in resource use.  So, in the  light  of these results,  what 
economic interpretation can be placed upon the index "NDP" as defined above, 
and what explains the divergence between NDP and welfare? 
An examination of Figure 1 can help provide an interpretation of the "orthodox" 
measure of income.  For each unit extracted, there is a net (marginal) addition of 
welfare to the economy, given by the price as read off the demand curve less the 
shadow price,  At  whatever final quantity is extracted in a given period,  the 
marginal contribution to welfare is then multiplied over the units extracted. 
This provides another interpretation of the observation that NDP is zero over the 
efficient path.  The standard marginal  reasoning should make clear that one 
should extract in every period until the marginal contribution to social welfare in 
that  period  is  zero.  However,  at  quantities below  the  efficient  level,  the 
marginal contribution is positive.  The problem I have outlined  above arises 
because we conventionally give this magnitude (NDP) a total interpretation, 
implying bigger is better.  For marginal measures where there are diminishing 
returns, less is typically more; certainly it is true here until we get to zero. 
The key result of this paper (summarised here as "maximising greened national 
income is inconsistent with maximising national economic welfare")  is easily 
l3  Robert Solow (in Solow 1991) suggests that simply keeping tabs on how much of (gross) 
national income comes &om non-renewable resources is usefhl if we believe that reinvesting 
resource rents is a usefbl rule of thumb for sustainability. understood by consideration of the role of consumers' surplus.  Starting from a 
benchmark level of extraction (that level consistent with economic efficiency, 
4@),  a marginal decrease in the amount extracted in that period will raise the 
market price (or alternatively, the marginal benefit) of the resource.  The shadow 
price remains  constant (using the beginning-period  shadow price) as per the 
original Hotelling path, thus raising net income even while lowering the amount 
consumed. 
8.  A Digression into Renewable Resources and Hicksisn Income 
Having  investigated  the  issue  of  welfare  inconsistency  in  the  context  of 
exhaustible resources,  we  digress  briefly  to  consider  an  example  involving 
consumption of a renewable resource.  Imagine in particular that instead of a 
cake-eating economy, we have a "hit-eating"  economy: all consumption comes 
from  a  single  good  produced  each  period.  We  further presume  that  this 
economy (about which  we will  make  similar heroic assumptions to those in 
section 3) is in a  steady state, such that consumption is constant, and  total 
investment-'keplantingy7-is  just  that  amount  needed  to  cover  physical 
depreciation, Our final heroic assumption is that this steady state also represents 
a  social optimum in that, with  costless harvesting and  a  social rate of  time 
preference equal to the ?ate  of return on capital" as defined by the harvest rate 
with respect to the capital stock of hit-bearing trees, there is no incentive to 
speed up or slow down consumption from the steady-state level. 
Given these assumptions, how do we express income in this economy?  Our 
formulation in (2) was a variation on the theme of income as the sum of two 
components: the social value of  consumption and  the (shadow) value of the 
change in the capital stock. Denoting the stock of fruit-bearing capital as S, and 
the harvest of fruit consumed in any period as h, then with utility U  = U@),  with 
positive first and negative second derivatives, net income is: 
NDe  = U!  (h, ).h, + U!  (h,  ).AS, Denote the steady-state consumption harvest as h* (which is also the efficient 
level of consumption), with AS = 0.  Then: 
What we have artificially constructed is a world which is consuming Hicksian, 
or sustainable, income-that  which society can consume without impoverishing 
itself later on-and  is also welfare-maximising.  Imagine now that, as before, 
we allow for a hypothetical divergence from this constant consumption path.  In 
particular, if consumption were to fall slightly, then d@)  would increase as h 
fell, and AS  > 0.  The net effect on the product d@).h  would depend on the 
function U, but it is completely plausible that for a reasonable functional form, 
the overall effect on NDP of such a change in consumption would be to increase 
it.  Note that, as in the earlier examples (and by construction in this one), welfare 
falls as income rises. 
9.  Concluding Comments 
Advocates  of  natural  resource  accounting  argue  that  poorly  constructed 
accounting aggregates lead to poor policy decisions (with respect to economic 
well being and/or sustainability), and that improving the accounting process by 
including measures of resource depletion and environmental degradation will 
necessarily  lead  to  better  signals to  policy  makers  and  thus  better  policy 
decisions. 
Criticisms  of  this  view  are  usually  based  on  mis-measurement  or 
incompleteness argument: that is, by including some but not  all the relevant 
environmental assets, or by valuing them  inaccurately, we may still have a 
misdirected compass.14  Here, by contrast, mis-measurement  or non-inclusion 
are not at issue. All relevant factors are included and valued appropriately. 
l4  See for example the argument about "sustainability relevant" pricing in Common (1995, pp. 
196-7). In  this  paper,  we  investigated the  correspondence between  movements  in 
income and  movements  in welfare  in  a simple  cake-eating economy when 
national income was appropriately "greened" so as to take into account resource 
depletion. The  goal  was  to  see whether  there  was  a  clear correspondence 
between income and welfare such that an adjusted measure of income could be 
used as a policy-relevant decision rule. 
In  such  a  resource-dependent  (cake-eating)  economy,  regardless  of  the 
depreciation rule employed, it was shown that income could always be made to 
increase by following an inefficient depletion program. That is, (intertemporal) 
welfare could fall as income rose. 
In  an  example  of  a  renewable  resource-dependent  economy  that  was 
simultaneously consuming sustainably and  maximising welfare, it was  also 
shown that income could increase while welfare fell. 
In all cases investigated here, income rose by reducing current consumption of 
the resource, indicating that although "geened"  national income was welfare- 
inconsistent, it  did  (to the extent that  it  acted  as a decision rule for policy 
makers) lead to lower consumption of natural resources.  However there was no 
sense in which "economic growth" (rising income as measured by the adjusted 
NDP) could be interpreted as automatically indicating increased welfare. 
These results are more than a "special  case" theoretical curiosity. The welfare 
interpretation afforded by the developers of Weitzman's  analysis is limited to 
specific  circumstances:  by  ignoring  the  impacts  on  consumers'  surplus, 
modifyrng our measure of national income in ways suggested from the literature 
does not  generally rectify  or  remove the bias  inherent  in  existing national 
accounting procedures. Depending upon the alternative accounting procedure 
adopted,  we  may  introduce a different bias: we end up steering by another 
"wrong compass". We note again that  this result-that  national income may rise while social 
welfare fdls-is  not 'bbvious"  in the sense that certain examples of welfare- 
inconsistency may be  obvious; for example, that measured output may rise 
while we are all working longer hours and being made miserable as a result. 
Such "obvious"  counter-examples to welfare-consistency typically depend on 
certain variables (e.g. leisure) being neglected in the accounts, or on practical 
difficulties with measurernentlvaluation.~~  In contrast, the examples presented 
here  violate  welfare  consistency  despite  the  fact  that  all  wevare-relevant 
variables (namely cment consumption of the cake and the consequent stock 
reduction,  affecting  future  cake  consumption)  are  accounted  for.  It  is 
(unmeasured) reductions in consumers'  surplus that explain how welfare can 
fall while measured income rises. 
The  analysis  also  explains  why  Hamilton  implicitly  views  NDP  as  an 
appropriate objective function, while Johansson and Lofgren are skeptical about 
its use in the more limited role of cost-benefit indicator. Hamilton's conclusion 
depends  on  "certain  efficiency  conditions"  holding.  Yet,  arguably,  these 
efficiency conditions are part of the policy problem natural resource accounting 
is meant to address: in particular, are we using our natural resources efficiently? 
If  we  don't  know  how  efficient  our  resource use is, using natural resource 
accounting techniques is problematic in trying to assess how efficient we are 
being! l6 
Complicating  our  analysis  by  relaxing  certain  assumptions  will  obviously 
change  the  specific  results  generated  in  any  given  context.  Allowing  for 
htemational  trade,  namely  exporting  the  resource  in  exchange  for  a 
consumption good, means that the slower depletion that drove the earlier results 
l5 For discussion of more practical problems associated with implementing natural resource 
accounting, and utilizing such measures in a policy context, see (for example) Aaheirn and 
Nyborg  (1995). 
l6  Professor N.V. Long, in a presentation to the 1999 Economists' Conference at La Trobe 
University, has brought my attention to a new paper by Weitzman where he advocates including 
consurners~urplus  in the linearised Hamiltonian measure of Hartwick, Maler and others. This 
would immediately improve adjusted income on welfare-consistency lines but would require 
consumers' surplus (or changes thereof fi-om  year to year) to be measured for all relevant 
commodities in the accounts, a truly formidable task. need not violate welfare consistency at the national level. To the extent that the 
exporter has market power, the lost consumers' surplus is now at the expense of 
foreign rather than domestic consumers: this is analogous to an optimal tariff 
argument. (Gains to the individual country in this case come at the expense of 
the rest of the world.) On the other hand, without market power, the resource- 
dependent economy will face an  exogenous price path regardless of its own 
depletion. 
Adding pollution  effects, reinvestment opportunities and  so on  adds further 
complications. As an example, if the higher oil prices due to OPEC over certain 
stages of their existence led to higher growth paths for those member countries 
that invested the proceeds in productive capital (and arguably greater growth 
opportunities for other countries that found greater access to credit as a result of 
"petrodollars",  offsetting  somewhat  the  impact  of  higher  prices  in  oil- 
consuming countries), lower rates of oil usage and lower global pollution as a 
result, it is hard to assess what the net global impact of all these effects would 
be. (This is not to argue that the actual benefit of OPEC was favourable to the 
world. Nor is it to suggest that OPEC was collectively behaving "as if  'it  was 
following some rule to maximise "greened national income7',) 
What remains apparent though, is for modified measures of national income to 
have  desirable properties--even  where  there  are no  data  problems  and  no 
neglected variables-specific  circumstances need  to  hold.  In  general, while 
there are obvious problems with our current "economic compass", there can be 
no  guarantees that the compass has been properly aligned by employing the 
standard recommended natural resource accounting procedures. APPENDIX  Violations of Welfare Consistency 
The proofs of welfare-inconsistency as defined in the paper rest on showing that 
the  periodic  levels  of  resource  extraction  that  maximize  GDP  violate  the 
Hotelling  condition  for  optimal  resource  depletion,  indicating  a  divergence 
between extraction to maximize income and extraction to maximize welfare. 
GDP is not welfare-consistent: 
Pr  Given  a  negative,  monotonic  which  solves  for  the  quantity  qt* =--- 
P: ' 
relationship between p  and  q, and invariance of demand for the resource, then 
q: will be positive; and if (as assumed) there are no discoveries of new resource 
stocks then q, will be constant for all t.  This is sufficient to violate Hotelling- 
efficiency which requires a rising market price, and declining extraction, over 
time.  QED. H 
NDP (orthodox depreciation) is not welfare-consistent: 
which solves for qr  = ''  -  . (This is done for the case in which the shadow 
P: 
price is defined as at the beginning of the period, and thus is not  affected by 
current period extraction.)  With the same assumptions as above, it is the case that if  p,  < p, ,  then  q: > 0.  For the shadow price to be less than the market 
price, the amount extracted must be less than the efficient amount. This violates 
the Hotelling condition that p,  = p, . 
We can also consider, for completeness, the possibility that the shadow price is 
calculated on the basis of the stock at the end of the period rather than at the 
beginning.  For  end-of-period  shadow  prices  (that  is,  p,  = p,(q,)),  quantity 
Pr  Since  > 0,  it must  again be the case that  for 
P: -  P:  ' 
q: > 0, p,  e p,  must hold, and the Hotelling rule is again violated.  QED. . 
NDP (Hicksian depreciation) is not welfare-consistent: 
One  definition of depreciation not  often referred to  in the literature can be 
gleaned from Hicks himself: 
"Let  us then define the depreciation of the original stock of 
capital  as  the  difference between  the  total  value  of the 
goods comprising the original stock as it is at the end of the 
year  (C,)  and the value (c!)  which would have been put 
upon  the  initial stock at  the  beginning of the year  if  the 
events of the year  had  been  correctly foreseen,  including 
among those events the capital value  C,  at the end of the 
year." (p 136, Hicks 1942, emphasis in original.) 
It would seem that the most appropriate-or perhaps just  the most obvious- 
way to inteterpret Hicks' version (which he describes as the "Swedish" definition 
of depreciation) in ihe context of a simplistic cake-eating story is to apply the 
period t+l shadow price to the period t capital stock.  In my notation, C, = p,Q 
and do  = p,a,  (noting that Q,  =  Qo -  qo)  giving us: This can be shown to violate welfare-consistency as easily as was shown for the 
orthodox measure of income in the previous section. I 
NDP full-change-in-value depreciation) is not welfare-consistent: 
National income (calculated for period zero) with this depreciation formula is as 
follows. 
noting again that Q, ;= Qo -  go, 
The first order condition in this case reduces to: 
which  can  be  thought  of  as a  "marginal revenue = marginal  shadow  cost" 
condition.  By  contrast,  the  FOC  of  the  Hotelling  problem  simply  equates 
shadowfactual prices  in  each  period,  in present  value  terns.  (Note that  the 
derivative terms are with respect to current extraction, with  p:  c 0,p: > 0 .)  It 
reduces to the following expression for quantity. The denominator of this right hand side is negative, so for positive extraction, 
q: > 0, the shadow price in the next period must be less than the current price 
which implies inefficiently low extraction today to push up today's price and (by 
increasing the remaining stock) lower tomorrow's unit shadow value. QED. I 
NDP (Net Price depreciation) is not welfare-cansistent: 
rn 
It  should  be  apparent  that  the  Net  Price  method  would  result  in  NDP  of 
definitionally zero,  regardless of extraction,  This method  does not so much 
violate  welfse-consistency  as  provide  absolutely  no  useful  information 
whatever, I 
NDP (Present Value depreciation) is not welfare-consistent: 
To think about maximising income in this case, rewrite income by defining a 
value hction  for the resource stock, V(Q), which measures the present value of 
the stock extant at a given time, so that in period zero, as depletion is about to 
begin: 
i.e. income is written as: 
The welfme-consistency  criterion invites  us  to  regard  this  expression as  an 
objective hction, so that the value function becomes: Using Bellman's Principle of Optimality the FOC for this expression is: 
where  is the discount factor.  The interpretation of the first-order condition is 
that  the  social  planner  should  deplete  such  that  the  marginal  profit  fiom 
extraction  in  a  period  is just  equal  to  the  change in  present  value  of  the 
remaining stock.  This is because at the optimum, an increase in profit today will 
just be offset by an equal decline in the present value of the unexploited stock. 
But what should be clear is that this problem is simply a decomposition of the 
more general one of choosing a depletion plan to maximise the value .function 
itself, and  that  is the objective hction that would face a profit-maximising 
monopolist!  In other words, the incentives provided to a resource manager who 
uses the impact of extraction on the national accounts as a guide to how to use 
the  resource,  suggest  that  the best  thing  to  do  based  on  the  present  value 
criterion is behave as  a monopolist  would, rather than  as a competitive firm 
would. W 
GDP (User Cost adjustment) is not welfare-consistent: 
In El SeraSy's formulation, the relevant computation is: 
GDP, = p,q, -  user cost 
The user cost component is calculated by dividing receipts R into income X and 
user cost (R-X),  such that if (R-X) was reinvested annually at the prevailing 
rate of interest, it would earn X in perpetuity. (See El Serafy 1989 for a detailed 
derivation.)  Without performing any calculations, it is easy to establish that the same general incentives that apply above also apply here.  As El Serafy points 
out regarding his accounting methodology: 
"A  country that liquidates its mineral reserves over fi& 
years needs to set aside for reinvestment a smaller portion 
of its receipts than another that liquidates its reserves over 
twenty years, and thus it can count a larger portion of its 
receipts  as  income." (El  Serafy  1989, p14,  emphasis in 
original.) 
So, as before, slower depletion tends to be rewarded in the national accounts; 
here the reward  occurs through  slower depletion increasing the proportion of 
receipts being  measured  as income.  Again  there  will  be  a trade-off  since 
excessively slow depletion will reduce absolute receipts so much that having a 
higher proportion designated as income will no longer compensate.  This point 
is unlikely to occur at levels of efficient  depletion as characterised by Hotelling. 
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